People First, Nations Second: A New Role for the United Nations by Maogoto, Jackson N
[2000]  Australian International Law Journal
1
PEOPLE FIRST, NATIONS SECOND
A NEW ROLE FOR THE UNITED NATIONS
Jackson Nyamuya Maogoto*
…we have probably reached a stage in the ethical and psychological evolution of Western 
civilization in which the massive and deliberate violation of human rights will no longer 
be tolerated.
Perez dé Cuellar (1991)
INTRODUCTION
The tragedy of East Timor coming so soon after that of Kosovo has 
focused attention again on the weaknesses of previous United Nations 
missions that have been ad hoc, reactive, and narrowly focused on solving 
the international emergency of the moment. The United Nations and its 
Members must focus on the need for timely intervention to save civilian 
populations from mass slaughter. It must adopt a new role as the assertive 
custodian of human rights because the use of its enforcement powers in the 
domestic affairs of rogue States may have a deterrent effect. Therefore, it 
should lead the way in defining its interventionist role in the emerging 
international norm of humanitarian intervention.
THE UNITED NATIONS’ ROLE
The conduct of national elections has become one of the most visible and 
concrete aspects of United Nations involvement in the domestic affairs of 
States today.1 However, its participation in the domestic affairs of States 
has been overly cautious and mainly through the supervision and/or 
monitoring of elections at the invitation of the host State. This recognises 
that the principles of national sovereignty and non-interference in domestic 
affairs are fundamental principles and key pillars of the United Nations 
Charter. In practice, this usually means a request by States for campaign 
and poll monitoring or for technical, financial and security assistance from 
the organisation. Since 1990 the United Nations has been involved in the 
elections in many States undergoing political transformation including
*
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1
 See United Nations Centre for Human Rights, United Nations, Human Rights and 
Elections: Handbook on the Legal, Technical and Human Rights Aspects of Elections, 
United Nations Doc HR/p/ot/2 (1994). 
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Albania, Angola, Cambodia, Haiti, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, 
Nicaragua and South Africa.
The form and extent of United Nations intervention are set to change if the 
historic addresses of Secretary-General Kofi Annan and President Bill 
Clinton at the 54th Annual Session of the General Assembly on 20 and 21 
September 1999 respectively are anything to go by.2 Both leaders alluded 
to the fact that rogue states should not expect their borders to protect them 
in the face of massive, organised and systematic violations of human rights. 
Further, Kofi Annan pointed out that there was nothing in the Charter to 
preclude the recognition that there were rights beyond borders. 
These pronouncements have come in the wake of heinous atrocities 
committed by States, including deliberate, massive and systematic tortures 
and executions by both State and non-State actors in various corners of the 
world.3 They have happened at a time when State actions have been under 
more international scrutiny and many of them are under the control of 
oppressive national regimes whose political architecture began during the 
post-World War II era.4 When democratic changes swept through Eastern 
Europe, Asia and Africa in the 1990s and the citizenry clamoured for 
democracy, transparency and accountability in government, the regimes 
were vicious in the face of these challenges to their political authority and 
civil governance styles.5 They used the doctrine of sovereignty and the 
principle of self-determination as mantles to defend against outside
interference and sought to address their abuse and misconduct in domestic 
affairs by the abridgment of fundamental human rights.6
2The text of the speeches can be accessed at the following URL 
<http://unbisnet.un.org/webpac-bic/wgbroker>. 
3
 Examples are the 1992 ethnic cleansing frenzy by the Serbs during the break-up of 
Yugoslavia, the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, the brutal struggle in Liberia, and the 
bloodbath in East Timor.
4
 For example see Chirot D, Modern Tyrants: the Power and Prevalence of Evil in our Age 
(1994, Free Press, New York); Davidson B, The Black Man’s Burden and the Curse of the 
Nation State (1992, James Currey, London).
5
 Examples are: (1) the brutal repression of opposition meetings in Kenya in 1992 
following calls for multi-partyism in a de jure one party state; (2) the crackdown on 
political activists and arbitrary detentions in Nigeria in 1995 after the annulment of 
civilian elections by the military regime; (3) the high-handed handling by Indonesia 
following the 1998 Jakarta riots that toppled Suharto from power; and (4) the political 
repression in Burma that was targeted at pro-democracy activists.
6
 “Nigeria accuses West of smears”, New York Times, 18 November 1995 at A4.
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During the 1960s and 1970s socialist and third world States dominated the 
General Assembly.7 They construed the self-determination principle in 
several key international instruments of that period narrowly and excluded 
the international scrutiny of cases where political rights were denied to 
their citizens.8 It was ironic that the worst human rights offenders were 
often the most vocal advocates of the principle of self-determination. 
Against this background, it is suggested that it would be more pragmatic in 
a changed world order for the United Nations to develop and advance 
human rights and become its custodian. If accepted, the organisation 
should be able to use it as justification for its interventionist role, including 
the use of military force where appropriate.9
Principles on self-determination, State sovereignty and involvement in the 
domestic affairs of States should not hinder such express responsibility 
supporting human rights.10 The human rights responsibilities of the global 
community should not be driven by or seen as a mere public relations 
exercise. There are international instruments on human rights including the 
Charter, the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights,11 the 1967 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”),12 the 1966 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(“ICESCR”)13 and the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR. Professor Louis 
Henkin has referred to them as a collective International Bill of Rights14
representing a global consensus that an international responsibility for 
human rights exists. In reality, the position is complex because the United 
Nations is an organisation of States that are represented by governments, 
7
 They included the USSR, Peoples Republic of China, Iraq, Syria, Mexico and virtually 
all the new independent African States.
8
 Cassesse, “The General Assembly in historical perspective 1945-1989” in Alston P 
(editor), The United Nations and Human Rights (1992, Clarendon Press, Oxford) 40-46.
9
 The intervention in East Timor by a United Nations authorised international force 
mandated to bring law and order to a territory, to which an independent nation-state lays 
claim, is counter to the traditional United Nations policy of intervention in a situation with 
a supposedly “well-defined international dimension.”
10
 Crosette, “China and others reject pleas that the United Nations halt civil wars”, New 
York Times, 23 September 1999 at <http://www.nytimes.com/library/wo…1/092399nati 
ons-intervention.html>; Leopold, “China castigates west on humanitarian intervention”, 
Reuters News Agency, 25 September 1999 at <http://biz.yahoo.com/rf/990922/bcr. html>. 
11
 General Assembly Resolution 217a, United Nations Doc A/810 (1948).
12
 999 United Nations Treaty Series 171.
13
 993 United Nations Treaty Series 3.
14
 See Henkin L, The Age of Rights (1990, Columbia University Press, New York).
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some of which are major violators of human rights.15
Following the end of the Cold War, the United Nations developed new 
roles concerning its peacekeeping efforts. For example, military-style 
humanitarian intervention and enforcement actions have occurred in places 
like Somalia, Iraq and more recently in Bosnia and East Timor. However, 
such action has not always been implemented. Owing to superpower 
hostility to anything substantial in peacekeeping, former United Nations 
Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold devised the Concept and Guiding 
Principles for the United Nations Emergency Forces.16 This was a 
compromise solution that used lightly armed units of military personnel 
who acted more like policemen than soldiers do. To meet today’s needs, 
the Security Council should lower the criteria when considering the 
appropriate conditions for peacekeeping and devise formal rules of 
engagement for peacekeepers that are sufficient to meet the needs of the 
conflict, taking into consideration the area to which the forces are sent. 
This would change peacekeeping into peacemaking.
Sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence as norms have 
weakened over time. The growing body of human rights law and the 
developing practice of the Security Council under Article 39 of the Charter 
in Iraq, Somalia, Bosnia and East Timor all point to an emerging 
customary norm of United Nations humanitarian intervention. These have 
occurred where humanitarian violations had been severe or had the 
slightest trans-boundary effect. It may be argued that this norm was 
crystallised when the organisation authorised intervention in East Timor. 
As the Security Council liberalises the meaning of “threat to the peace” to 
include non-military threats, the likelihood of future humanitarian 
intervention will rise. As it increasingly encounters threats to the safety of 
its peacekeepers, it should be prepared to exercise a level of force that goes 
beyond mere self-defence.
In East Timor, InterFET was replaced by the United Nations Assistance 
15
 See Goodrich LM, The United Nations in a Changing World (1974, Columbia 
University Press, New York) 2.
16
 United Nations Department of Public Information, The Blue Helmets: A review of 
United Nations Peace-keeping, 18 UN DOC. DP1/1065, Sales No. E.90.I.18 (1990) 47-48. 
This principles were devised by Hammarskjold for the UNEF I forces. The principles in 
this paper were not initially penned by the Secretary General, but reflect precepts which 
have developed through subsequent peacekeeping operations.
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Mission in East Timor (“UNAMET”).17 The change in the peace-making 
mandate of the original international force for East Timor with a traditional 
peacekeeping mandate clearly indicates that the United Nations is 
reviewing the military dimensions of its forces. This addresses the question 
raised by the United Nations Protection Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
(“UNPROFOR”), namely, what is an acceptable level of force consistent 
with “all necessary measures” that United Nations authorised missions may 
use to deliver aid to those in need? Are United Nations troops allowed to 
use force in “anticipatory” self-defence?
As original peace-making missions mandated to use force such as InterFET 
are launched the rules of engagement and the authority for the use of force 
should be modified and enunciated articulately. However, the stakes are 
high. The safety of peacemakers, the continued viability of the collective 
security structure of the United Nations and the maintenance of 
international peace and security in future operations are all dependent on 
the ability of the organisation to respond to this challenge.18
USE OF FORCE – HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Peacekeeping and peace enforcement originate in Chapter VII of the 
Charter. Inter alia, the Charter is based on principles of sovereignty, non-
intervention and the peaceful settlement of international disputes. Although 
peacekeeping is not explicit in the Charter, it has evolved over the past 50 
years into a well developed concept governed by a distinct set of principles.
When the Cold War ended, the United Nations took on a new and 
aggressive role as a peacemaker that used military force. Iraq’s aggression 
in Kuwait was met by an international coalition of armed forces authorised 
by the organisation. The humanitarian crisis precipitated by the Iraqi 
oppression of the Kurds and the inability to supply food and assistance to 
the civilian population in war-ravaged Somalia presented the organisation 
with new challenges. The issues had political, military, international and 
domestic implications. But it was the recent humanitarian intervention in 
17
 Security Council Resolution 1264 of 1999.
18
 The Clinton administration introduced very stringent guidelines for future participation 
in international peacekeeping operations. The United States would only participate if there 
have been grave threats to international peace and security, major disasters which require 
relief, or “gross violations of human rights”: “US eyes new criteria for peacekeeping 
missions”, Chicago Sun Times, 30 January 1994 at 36.
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East Timor by an international force expressly authorised to use force to 
bring about law and order in the territory and to protect fundamental 
human rights that shook the United Nation’s key pillars, the principles of 
sovereignty and non-intervention.
Peacekeeping has seen a number of evolutionary stages. It began with the 
use of force in self-defence only. From there it moved on to a goodwill 
presence that was authorised by a host government. The next step was 
active military action by international forces authorised by the United 
Nations against aggressive governments and more recently the world 
witnessed the humanitarian peacemaking efforts of the international force 
in East Timor. The main aim of the efforts was to halt human rights 
violations and restore law and order in a territory to which a sovereign 
State had earlier laid claim. Such efforts had been characterised by the use 
of all necessary force in the peacekeeping and peace enforcement action 
and a simultaneous lack of goodwill by the host government.
Article 2 of the Charter provides the twin norms of State sovereignty and 
the non-use of force. The prohibition extends to the use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any State within the terms 
of Article 2(3) of the Charter:
All members shall refrain in their international relations from the 
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state or in any other manner inconsistent with the 
purposes of the United Nations.
Article 2(3) is broader than Articles I-II of the 1928 General Treaty for the 
Renunciation of War,19 commonly known as “the Briand/Kellog Pact” or 
Pact of Paris and for all intents and purposes has superseded the Briand-
Kellog Pact.20 Generally speaking, the Briand/Kellog Pact renounces war 
as an instrument of national policy. It prohibits the use and threat of use of 
force and war ceased to be a national right. It provides:
Article I
The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the names of their 
19
 94 League of Nations Treaty Series 57.
20
 In spite of this, this treaty has never been terminated. For more discussion refer to 
Harris DJ, Cases and Materials on International Law (1998, Sweet & Maxwell, London) 
861-862.
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respective peoples that they condemn recourse to war for the solution 
of international controversies, and renounce it as an instrument of 
national policy in their relations with one another.
Article II
The High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement or solution of all 
disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may 
be, which may arise among them, shall never be sought except by 
pacific means.
Following the aftermath of World War II, war was cast as an international 
crime. The 1919 League of Nations Covenant21 in Articles 15 and 16 
sought to limit resort to war and, as seen above, the Briand/Kellog Pact did 
likewise. 
Although Article 2(4) was first thought to outlaw any use of force by a 
State against another State, exceptions to this provision were subsequently 
used to justify unilateral interventions.22 The following provision in Article 
51 was an exception expressly built into the Charter:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of 
individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a 
Member.
This provision permits enforcement actions that the Security Council 
authorises. However, there are implicit exceptions to Article 2(4) that are 
derived from the provision itself based on the argument that it prohibits the 
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of 
another State. However, it does not apply to an intervention that is not 
intended to even temporarily occupy the State’s territory or interfere with 
its political autonomy or sovereignty.23 Nonetheless, this argument is now 
under siege because both Secretary-General Kofi Annan and President Bill 
Clinton pointed out during the 54th Annual Session of the General 
Assembly that rogue states should not expect their borders to protect 
them.24 They argued that international concern for human rights took 
21
 16 United Kingdom Treaty Series 4.
22
 Henkin L, The Use of Force: Law and US Policy in Right v Might: International Law 
and Use of Force (1989, Council on Foreign Relations Press, New York) 38.
23
 Ibid 39-40.
24
 See discussion above.
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precedence over claims of non-interference in domestic matters.25
The doctrine of state sovereignty, long protected by the principles of non-
intervention and self-determination in the domestic affairs of States, is 
recognised as customary international law and enshrined in the Charter. 
Further, Article 2(7) acknowledges the following:
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorise the United 
Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic 
jurisdiction of any state.
However, the provision is limited by an exception that allows the 
“application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII”. Article 2(7) 
prohibits the United Nations, not States, from intervening in the domestic 
affairs of Member States.26 However, in practice, the principle of non-
intervention is eroded whenever States commit themselves to intervene 
when called upon by the United Nations for the greater good of the 
international community.27 The large body of human rights law that has 
developed in conventional and customary law has also contributed to this 
and the development of Article 2(7), which indicates that violations of 
internationally recognised standards are not always matters that fall 
completely within a State’s domestic jurisdiction. This erosion of Article 
2(7) has contributed in part to the increase in United Nations interventions 
in the post Cold War era,28 which in turn has sometimes led to complex 
operations that have elements of peacekeeping and peace enforcement.
The trend mirrors the effects of globalisation and the numerous treaties and 
conventions that States enter into. It has reduced the world into a global 
village where actions, whether military, political or economic, by one State 
may adversely affect a neighbouring State or States.29 Thus, sovereignty 
25
 See Chirot D, Modern Tyrants: the Power and Prevalence of evil in our Age (1994, Free 
Press, New York) 3.
26
 See Kartashkin, “Human rights and humanitarian intervention” in Damrosch LF and 
anor (editors), Law and Force in the New International Order (1991, Westview Press, 
Oxford).
27
 Scheffer, “Toward a modern doctrine of humanitarian intervention”, (1992) 22 
University of Toledo Law Review 253, 262. 
28
 Half of the 26 United Nations authorised missions have been after the Cold War ended.
29
 Examples are the mass trans-boundary movement of refugees and regional tension 
created by arms testing.
[2000]  Australian International Law Journal
9
has undergone the metamorphosis from individual supremacy, which 
accompanies the birth of the sovereign State, to collective responsibility 
that is consonant with globalisation and the contemporary cohesiveness of 
the international community. The notions that sovereignty does not entitle a 
government to kill its own people and that outsiders have a duty to take 
action if it occurs are captured by Kofi Annan who surmised that nothing in 
the Charter precluded a recognition that there were rights beyond borders.
PEACEKEEPING 
Generally, there are two categories of peacekeeping, observer missions and 
peacekeeping forces. The United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation 
(“UNTSO”) was one of the first peacekeeping operations established by 
the Security Council. It was created with the consent of States to supervise 
the truce and Armistice Agreements between the newly formed State of 
Israel and four of its Arab neighbours in 1948-1949. Such observers were 
not armed. When Dag Hammarksjold was Secretary-General, he made
UNTSO a traditional model for United Nations peacekeeping.
The 1956 Suez conflict provided the United Nations with its first 
opportunity to deploy an armed peacekeeping force, the United Nations 
Emergency Force (“UNEF”). UNEF’s primary mandates under General 
Assembly Resolution 1000 were to secure a ceasefire between British, 
French, Israeli and Egyptian forces in the Sinai Peninsula, direct the 
withdrawal of the non-Egyptian forces from Egyptian territory and patrol 
the border areas. Also, INEF was responsible for achieving the aims of the 
Egypt-Israeli Armistice Agreement. Dag Hammarskjold indicated that 
although it was not a military force controlling temporarily the territory in 
which it was stationed, UNEF was more than just an observer because its 
troops were clearly intended to be deployed for peaceful purposes.30
A larger and potentially more dangerous deployment of peacekeepers 
occurred when the United Nations established the Operation in the Congo 
(ONUC) from 1960-1964. Originally, ONUC was set up to defuse the 
separatist civil war taking place in the recently decolonised Congo. 
Belgium, the former colonial power, was required to remove its troops 
from the Congo under the United Nation’s mandate. Although not 
30
 United Nations Department of Public Information, The Blue Helmets: A Review of 
United Nations Peace-keeping 18 UN Doc DP1/1065 (1990) at 48.
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deployed for the purpose of initiating any use of force, ONUC’s mandate 
included assisting the Congolese government with the restoration of law 
and order. After the government disintegrated and attacks on United 
Nations personnel took place in February 1961, the Security Council 
authorised ONUC to “take immediately all appropriate measures to prevent 
the occurrence of civil war in the Congo, including…the use of force, if 
necessary, in the last resort.”31
The mandate was expanded in November 1961. By January 1963 ONUC 
numbered some 20,000 fully armed troops including tanks, heavy artillery 
and fighter jets.32 This operation reflected the traditional model that Dag 
Hammarskjold established in 1949 because it was not confrontational in 
character nor subject to a strict military discipline. When ONUC’s mandate 
was expanded in 1961 to remove foreign mercenaries, it broke new ground. 
The troops were authorised to move freely within the Congo and their 
military intervention successfully prevented the secession of Katanga.33
However, this model was abandoned by subsequent mandates but was 
resurrected three decades later with the end of the Cold War.
CLASSICAL PEACEKEEPING PARADIGMS
The United Nations Charter does not expressly make peacekeeping a non-
enforcement action. Since the Charter was signed in 1945, there have been 
26 United Nations peacekeeping operations. Articles 24 and 36 on the 
Security Council procedures for the settlement of disputes impliedly 
provided for the early peacekeeping missions that involved unarmed 
observers and that were authorised by the Security Council. However, this 
legal authority for UNEF and ONUC operations was subject to 
controversy. When the Soviet Union and France refused to pay their 
apportioned dues for those missions, the International Court of Justice was 
given an opportunity in an advisory opinion to pronounce on the legality of 
withholding funds including the lawfulness of peacekeeping operations. 
This was the Certain Expenses Case.34
31
 General Assembly Resolution 161 of 1961.
32
 Durch WJ, “The UN operation in Congo” in Durch WJ (ed), The Evolution of UN 
Peacekeeping: Case Study and Comparative Analysis (1993, New York, St Martin’s 
Press).
33
 United Nations Department of Public Information, The Blue Helmets: A Review of 
United Nations Peace-keeping 18 UN Doc DP1/1065 (1990) at 250.
34
 [1962] International Court of Justice Reports 151. 
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In the above case, the International Court of Justice held that Article 14 of 
the United Nations Charter empowered both the Security Council and the 
General Assembly to authorise peacekeeping operations.35 The Court 
rejected the view that Article 43 agreements were required to establish 
peacekeeping forces and instead held that the operations were not coercive 
nor enforcement actions that required such authorisation. Thus, this case 
may be used as authority for the proposition that both Chapters VI and VII 
of the Charter have provisions that authorise the establishment of United 
Nations peacekeeping operations.
The early peacekeeping campaigns of the United Nations had three 
common elements or guiding principles. First, the operations should have 
the political support or at least the acquiescence of the five permanent 
members of the Security Council. Secondly, the consent and cooperation of 
the local parties to the dispute should be seen as essential for the 
deployment of United Nations peacekeepers. And thirdly, the neutrality or 
independence of the United Nations should be a primary ingredient for an 
effective peacekeeping operation. These guiding principles have come to 
distinguish peacekeeping operations in conflict situations from the more 
aggressive peace-making actions.36
The concept of self-defence and the principles of non-intervention and 
sovereignty were blurred and modified during the Congo operation. While 
peacekeepers today continue to heed the principle of self-defence, the 
political and mandate complexities of operations such as those in Iraq and 
the former Yugoslavia have blurred the strict neutrality and impartiality of 
these operations. Recently, the United Nations authorised its Members to 
undertake enforcement action aimed at more specific goals that required 
the use of troops in areas of conflict.37
35
 Article 14 provides that “the General Assembly may recommend measures for the 
peaceful adjustment of any situation, regardless of origin, which it deems likely to impair 
the general welfare or friendly relations among nations.”
36
 Fink, From peacekeeping to peace enforcement: the blurring of the mandate for the use 
of force in maintaining international peace and security”, (1995) 19 Maryland Journal of 
International Trade and Law 1, 14, 15.
37
 Refer Security Council Resolution 82 of 1950 on Korea, Security Council Resolutions 
660 and 678 of 1990 on Iraq, Security Council Resolution 794 of 1992 on Somalia, 
Security Council Resolution 929 of 1994 on Rwanda, Security Council Resolution 940 of 
1994 on Haiti, Security Council Resolutions 770,781,787, 816 of 1992-1994 on Bosnia, 
and Security Council Resolution 1299 of 1999 on East Timor.
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RISE OF PEACEMAKING
The traditional peacekeeping status and role of the United Nations have 
been changed from non-confrontational, with the consent and goodwill of 
the host State, to an aggressive presence lacking the goodwill of the host 
State. In practice, it may be observed that usually the host State had either 
been “bent” by the international community or the change in mandate had 
been necessitated by conditions that jeopardise the lives of United Nations 
troops in the arena of conflict. 
Enforcement Action
In June 1950 the Security Council authorised the use of force in a military 
enforcement action for the first time after North Korean troops crossed the 
38th parallel into South Korea. The Security Council met on 25 June and 
noted that the armed attack on South Korea by forces from the North 
constituted a breach of the peace under Article 39 of the Charter.38 Two 
days later the Security Council in Resolution 83 recommended that United 
Nations Members furnish such assistance to South Korea as was necessary 
to repel the armed attack and restore international peace and security to the 
region.39 When the Security Council could not use the Military Staff 
Committee that was established under Article 47 of the Charter to direct 
the military action, it established a unified military command with an 
American commander who reported to the President and Joint Chiefs of 
Staff of the United States.40
Although this enforcement action was the first time that the United Nations 
authorised the use of force under Chapter VII of the Charter, curiously 
none of the resolutions mentioned either Chapter VII or Article 42. A 
reason could have been the nature and military scope of the operation that 
seemed to involve the United Nations “sub-contracting” its peace 
enforcement powers to the United States. Further, this had taken place 
during a period of complex politics and international and military relations 
involving the superpowers that effectively frustrated any definitive or 
decisive action by the Security Council.41
38
 Security Council Resolution 82 of 1950.
39
 Security Council Resolution 83 of 1950. 
40
 Security Council Resolution 84 of 1950.
41
 For a more detailed analysis see Arend AC and anor, International Law and the Use of 
[2000]  Australian International Law Journal
13
The United Nations was able to act in this situation in the middle of the 
Cold War due to the absence of the Soviet Union from the Security Council 
when the crucial vote was taken.42 However, the text of the resolution 
mirrored caution and provided for a formal United Nations command. By 
providing for General Assembly involvement in the operation in this 
manner it aimed at preventing a political backlash from the Soviet Union. 
However, in reality, the operation was essentially a United States operation 
and this is an important fact because subsequent United Nations military 
actions in the post Cold War era involving the aggressive use of force have 
had no formal United Nations command.43
The end of the Cold War allowed the Security Council to authorise the use 
of force in a large-scale enforcement action for the second time. After Iraq 
invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990 the Security Council very quickly 
condemned the action and demanded the immediate and unconditional 
withdrawal of Iraq’s forces.44 In response to Iraq’s subsequent claim that it 
had annexed Kuwait, the Security Council in Resolution 665 on 25 August 
authorised the deployment of naval forces to enforce the sanctions 
provided in Resolution 661. In addition, the Security Council acted in 
Resolution 678 on 29 November by authorising its Members to use all 
necessary means to uphold and implement Resolution 660 and restore 
international peace and security to the area. These actions helped to prevent 
the fragmentation of world opinion on the United States’ claim that such 
United Nations authority was unnecessary. 
Using the actions in the Korean peninsula and the Persian Gulf as 
examples, for a time it appeared that the United Nations would most likely 
take action only when there was large-scale aggression by one State against 
another State. Furthermore, it appeared that it would do so only where the 
vital interests of at least some of the permanent members of the Security 
Force beyond the United Nations Charter Paradigm (1993, Routledge, New York) 11-19.
42
 The Soviet delegation was absent from the meetings of the Security Council in protest 
against Taiwan representing “China” in the Security Council (instead of the People’s 
Republic of China). 
43
 For example, Operation Desert Storm during the Gulf War, the military intervention in 
Haiti, and the Somalia humanitarian intervention were all under a United States command. 
On the other hand, the recent humanitarian intervention in East Timor was under an 
Australian command.
44
 United Nations Security Council resolution 660 of 1990.
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Council were at stake.45 There have been departures from this view 
recently as seen in Somalia and East Timor where the use of force was 
justified on humanitarian grounds and political or economic considerations. 
Intervention in Domestic Affairs
The principle of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of a State is 
grounded in Article 2(7) of the Charter. Usually, humanitarian intervention 
is defined within the context of a State or States using armed force to 
protect a population from large-scale human rights violations. Although the 
Charter does not explicitly mention the use of force for humanitarian 
purposes, the United Nations authorised relief operations in northern Iraq 
and Somalia to protect human rights. Recently, this was the basis for 
intervention by InterFET in East Timor.
(i) Kuwait
In response to renewed uprisings after his defeat in the Gulf War, Saddam 
Hussein’s military began to attack the populations in northern and southern 
Iraq to quell the uprisings. The renewed post Gulf War onslaught caused 
two million Kurds to leave the region and flee into Turkey and Iran. Since 
they have been denied entry into Turkey they remain in the inhabitable 
mountains of northern Iraq with reports of hundreds of deaths each day.46
At the behest of Turkey and France, the Security Council adopted 
Resolution 688 on 5 April 1991 that condemned the repression of the Iraqi 
civilian population and demanded that Iraq end the repression immediately. 
The section of the Resolution on intervention is contained in the third 
paragraph where the Security Council insisted that Iraq should allow 
immediate access by international humanitarian organisations to all those 
in need of assistance and make available all necessary facilities for their 
operations in Iraq.47 The acrimonious debate in the Security Council over 
45
 See Fifoot, “Functions and powers, and interventions: United Nations action in respect 
of human rights and humanitarian intervention” in Rodley NS (editor), To Loose the 
Bands of Wickedness: International Intervention in Defence of Human Rights (1992, 
Brassey’s, London) 48.
46
 For a detailed exposition see Freedman and anor, “ ‘Safe Havens’ for Kurds in post war 
Iraq” in Rodley NS (editor), To Loose the Bands of Wickedness: International 
Intervention in Defence of Human Rights (1992, Brassey’s, London) 44-45.
47
 At the height of the Safe Havens Operation over 21,000 American, British and French 
troops were deployed in the region: ibid.
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Resolution 688 indicated that the Resolution had been a controversy. 
Yemen and China argued that the intervention based on humanitarian 
grounds contravened the principle in Article 2(7) and would lead to a 
dangerous precedent.48 Resolution 688 dictated that Iraq would forgo its 
right to territorial integrity and allow the Allies to go into a host State to 
establish a relief operation without that State’s consent.
(ii) Somalia
In January 1991 President Said Barre’s dictatorial regime in Somalia was 
overthrown by combating rival factions resulting in the end of an effective 
government. The disjointed civil war that fragmented Somalia into 
fiefdoms under various warlords who presided over clan alliances 
prevented the transport of food and humanitarian aid to millions of starving 
Somalis. In January 1992 the situation deteriorated to such a degree that the 
Security Council unanimously enacted a weapons embargo on Somalia.49
During 1992 the Security Council sent a team to observe the administration 
of humanitarian aid there and deployed 50 United Nations observers by 
creating the United Nations Operation in Somalia (“UNOSOM”).50
The escalating chaos and civil anarchy required the Security Council to 
invoke Chapter VII of the Charter and increase the troop levels of 
UNOSOM peacekeepers. In November 1992 the United States offered to 
lead a military operation in order to deliver humanitarian aid to the Somalis 
following calls by the then Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali. As a 
result, the Security Council adopted Resolution 794 unanimously. The 
resolution authorised the Secretary-General and United Nations Members 
to cooperate to use all necessary means to establish a secure environment 
for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia as soon as possible.51 Based 
on this resolution, the United States sent a large armed contingent into 
48
 Rodley, “Collective intervention to protect human rights and civilian populations: the 
ntervention in Defence of Human Rights (1992, Brassey’s, London) 31. Yemen voted 
against the resolution while China abstained on the basis that this was an internal affair 
meriting no intrusion. China still holds this position as evidenced by the strongly worded 
speech of its Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan to the General Assembly during its 54th
Annual Session that lambasted “a new form of gunboat diplomacy.” 
49
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Somalia. The Security Council’s mandate to use force was unique because 
the operation was not in response to an act of aggression. The catalyst for 
this explicit humanitarian action under Chapter VII was Article 39, which 
determined that the continuing civil war in Somalia was a threat to 
international peace and security.52
(iii) East Timor
The changing status of the United Nations mandate is exemplified by 
Security Council Resolution 1264 that authorised the creation of InterFET. 
After the 30 August referendum in East Timor that was sponsored by the 
United Nations and following growing evidence of political cleansing, 
systematic torture, execution and large-scale organised detention and 
translocation of pro-independence East Timorese, InterFET was mandated 
to undertake a full military operation. In fact, the first and second drafts of 
Security Council Resolution 126453 had referred to the Indonesian army’s 
involvement in the violence in East Timor. However, this reference was 
omitted from the final draft to facilitate the unconditional withdrawal of 
Indonesian troops from the area and placate Indonesian outrage at the 
United Nations operation.54
Shortly after the United Nations authorised the troop deployment in East 
Timor there were reports of the militia moving into West Timor who set up 
training camps and military bases there.55 In hindsight, this justified to a 
greater extent the establishment of InterFET by the Security Council. 
Basis for Enforcement Action 
Enforcement actions under Chapter VII, such as those in Korea and Iraq, 
are clearly permissible under the Charter when authorised by the Security 
Council. The trans-boundary impact of a humanitarian violation is easier to 
52
 See Arend AC and anor, International Law and the Use of Force beyond the United 
Nations Charter Paradigm (1993, Routledge, New York) 55-56.
53
 Ibid.
54
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gauge than the measurement of a violation’s severity, which acts as the 
trigger for Security Council action within the terms of Article 39 and its 
reference to “threat to peace”. The trans-boundary effect of the refugee 
problem that was created in Iraq by the exodus of the Kurds gave the 
Security Council some leverage when determining that a threat to 
international peace and security existed in Iraq. With greater emphasis now 
on human rights as seen by the establishment of InterFET to halt the 
bloodbath in East Timor it appears that the Security Council’s expanded 
interpretation of what constitutes a threat to the peace includes severe 
humanitarian violations now.56
As peace-keeping and peace-making operations blend with humanitarian 
interventions, proponents of humanitarian intervention point to Articles 1, 
55-56 of the Charter to demonstrate the Charter’s emphasis on the 
protection of human rights and the maintenance of international peace and 
security.57 Several norms in international human rights law have emerged 
since the signing of the Charter. While efforts have been aimed at general 
human rights at a universal level, including the Universal Declaration, the 
ICCPR and the ICESCR, other instruments protect against specific abuses 
such as genocide,58 war crimes and crimes against humanity,59 slavery60
and torture.61
56
 For a comprehensive history of humanitarian interventions from the early nineteenth 
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intervention”, (1992) 22 University of Toledo Law Review 59. 
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Although the doctrine of sovereignty continues to play a pivotal role in 
international relations today, it has been weakened by the growing idea that 
through collective United Nations authorisation, its Members have the right 
to intervene when a human rights violation threatens international peace.62
A norm has also developed that they have the responsibility to ensure that 
any human rights violations anywhere are addressed.63 The forcible 
interventions in Somalia and northern Iraq support this proposition and in 
East Timor the international community bent the will of the Indonesian 
government in spite of the latter calling the intervention an unacceptable 
violation of its territorial integrity and an abuse of its political 
independence.
Thus, humanitarian intervention is a new consideration for the international 
and collective use of force as the body of human rights law grows. When 
the Security Council had authorised the use force to combat the widespread 
and flagrant violations of international humanitarian law, its peace 
enforcement measures had gradually overtaken peacekeeping missions. 
This was evidenced when the mandates of UNOSOM and UNPROFOR 
were subsequently expanded. They showed that when peacekeepers, who 
are generally trained in non-violent reaction and self-defence, are 
confronted by hostility they have to adopt an aggressive dimension and the 
missions come to resemble enforcement actions ultimately. 
The situation in the former Balkan republics presented the United Nations 
with a challenge that tested both the organisation’s ability to respond to a 
rapidly growing conflict situation and the efficacy of non-traditional 
peacekeeping operations. This crisis, which had progressively escalated 
since 1991, is an example of the inherent dangers that the organisation may 
face in a dynamic arena of potential as well as real conflict. 
The negative publicity and criticism of UNPROFOR are not so much a 
reflection of the military calibre of the peacekeepers but rather the over-
62
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(1992, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia) 275.
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politicising of peacekeeping issues in the United Nations. The mandate of 
such forces as an issue dogged discussions in the General Assembly and 
Security Council during the Cold War era when such forces had virtually 
no military capability. When the Cold War ended, it was expected that the 
United Nations could quickly revise its guiding principles on the mandate 
of peacekeeping forces including their status as reactive rather than 
proactive. However, this was railroaded in 1993 by squabbling between the 
United States, Canada and Europe64 on the command of a possible 
permanent peacekeeping force. Consequently, the issue of the mandate of 
United Nations forces continues to be controversial but it is heartening to 
know that the organisation is open to new political perspectives and 
military dimensions when it engages in peacekeeping efforts. 
The possible military conflict in East Timor led to two phases in the United 
Nations’ military intervention there. First, an Australian-led international 
force had to wrestle control of East Timor from the pro-Indonesia militia. 
Secondly, pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1299 of 25 October 
1999 this was followed by the deployment of a traditional peacekeeping 
force. It seems that UNPROFOR’s impotence in Srebenica and the lessons 
learnt in the former Yogoslavia drove the Security Council to give its force 
in East Timor a wider berth in its military operations. The idea was not 
consent and goodwill but military expedience in establishing a robust and 
internationally supported socio-political infrastructure in East Timor to 
curb human rights atrocities and protect fundamental human rights. 
CHAPTER VII ACTION 
Enforcement actions under Chapter VII of the Charter are legal and the use 
of force is lawful if authorised by the Security Council for such purposes. 
For example, the measures authorised in Bosnia are explicit Chapter VII 
actions. As such, the measures fall within the exception of the last sentence 
of Article 2(7) relating to Chapter VII enforcement actions. Due to the 
increasing frequency with which the Security Council has initiated Chapter 
VII actions on the basis of humanitarian violations, it is worthwhile 
examining the status of interventions for humanitarian purposes in the light 
of its action in East Timor. It has been argued that “genuine instances of 
64
 See generally Powers, “The case for a permanent United Nations peacekeeping force”, 
Daily Nation, 13 April 1993, Special Reports Column.
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humanitarian intervention have been rare, if they have occurred at all.”65
Commentators point to the non-humanitarian interest or motives of the 
intervener, the political or economic considerations and the fact that no 
intervening State has used the pure rationale of humanitarian intervention 
to justify its use of force.66
The intervention in the Balkans was contentious since it was a “mixed 
conflict”.67 Nevertheless, it may be characterised as a predominantly 
humanitarian disaster that required Chapter VII action by the United 
Nations. However, the intervention in Somalia and East Timor is a strong 
challenge to the assertion that humanitarian interventions usually have 
underlying political and economic considerations. The locations of the 
territories and the absence of any visible or invisible overarching socio-
political or economic interests by the intervening powers point to purely 
humanitarian considerations aimed at fulfilling the lofty humanitarian 
ideals of the international community
Even in the former Yugoslavia, several Security Council resolutions have 
defined the humanitarian bases of intervention: the trans-boundary effects 
of the refugee situation in Bosnia,68 the inability to deliver humanitarian 
aid due to the civil war,69 and ethnic cleansing and other violations of 
humanitarian law.70 The findings that these circumstances were the bases 
for a threat to international peace and security are grounded in the 
recognition that the external refugee problem and the grave and systematic 
domestic humanitarian violations both warranted Chapter VII action.
The human rights situation in East Timor, a purely internal crisis, triggered 
the application of Article 39. The reports on political cleansing, massive 
and organised detention, translocation of the population, and systematic 
torture and murder of pro-independence East Timorese certainly made a 
compelling case for United Nations action. In any event, although the use 
65
 Arend AC and anor, International Law and the Use of Force beyond the United Nations 
Charter Paradigm (1993, Routledge, New York) 135.
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of humanitarian intervention to prevent these violations has not yet been 
accepted as an exception to Article 2(4) on the prohibition against the use 
of force, the use of Chapter VII is legal and presents strong evidence of 
emerging customary law. The prospect of this type of humanitarian 
diplomacy will increase potentially the number of original peace 
enforcement operations. It is foreseeable that in future peacekeepers will 
find their safety compromised as their missions involve enforcement action 
requiring more complex and refined rules of engagement in hostile 
environments. 
The comprehensive restructure of peacekeeping operations in 1992 by the 
United Nations seems to herald the genesis of a new role for peacekeeping 
and peacemaking. Traditionally, the Office of Special Political Affairs 
managed peacekeeping operations. The Office was administered by two 
Under-Secretaries-General (“USG”) who reported to the Secretary-
General. One USG managed field operations and mediation efforts 
associated with peace enforcement while the other was a political 
troubleshooter for the Secretary-General. Now, the peacemaking functions 
have been transferred to the Secretary-General’s Executive Office resulting 
in a complete separation of planning from political issues. This structure 
reflects the traditional view in the United Nations that there is a clear 
distinction between peacekeepers and peace enforcers and that the two 
should be kept apart. Peace enforcers receive military training while 
peacekeepers are trained in non-violent responses to provocation.71
The 1992 restructure included the creation of an Office of Peacekeeping 
Operations as one of four designated departments that reported to the 
Secretary-General directly. The restructure streamlined the peacekeeping 
administration and put in place a formal relationship between peacekeepers 
and peacemakers. However, as the missions become blurred and 
conventional peacekeeping forces become gradually engaged in more 
aggressive Chapter VII actions, training, equipment needs, command 
structures and the rules of engagement on the use of force will have to be 
reviewed to reflect the changing nature of peacekeeping.72
71
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of United Nations Peacekeeping (1993, St Martin’s Press, New York) 73-74. 
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THE HUMANITARIAN CUSTODIANSHIP 
Humanitarian intervention by the United Nations in non-State entities 
follows a history of participation in their elections when they are 
transitioning from colonial rule to independence.73 In contrast to its role in 
supervising and monitoring elections within the decolonisation context and 
sometimes for the purge of unpopular leftist regimes, the United Nations 
has now begrudgingly accepted the responsibility of intervention in the 
socio-political processes of States that violate fundamental human rights. 
Initially, when confronted by appeals for intervention of this nature the 
organisation had been unwilling and unprepared to respond.74 This 
reluctance was largely due to two reasons. First, there were the shackles 
that States had placed on the United Nations through a broad interpretation 
of the doctrine of sovereignty as enshrined in the Charter. Secondly, the 
United Nations preferred not to adopt a position or policy that could rock 
the global political boat.75
Slowly, however, the United Nations has begun to develop a tenuous 
international consensus on its new role in human rights matters.76
73
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Reflecting deep dogmatic reluctance among its Members and within its 
bureaucracy to expand its role in promoting the protection of fundamental 
human rights, the organisation has limited its intervention to more well-
defined circumstances, primarily in cases with a clear international 
dimension. However, the circumstances surrounding the recent intervention 
in East Timor have forced its hand and it must now address and develop 
the international norms for intervention to protect civilian populations from 
mass slaughter.77
The United Nations should expand and deepen its commitment to human 
rights values by abandoning the requirement of an international dimension 
and moving the substance of its involvement beyond the inter-State 
spectrum to the intra-state arena.78 It should transform its policy of limited 
involvement in the political affairs of States into a broader policy that 
creates a human rights custodianship. This new role was what the Kurds, 
the East Timorese and other oppressed populations around the world had 
been expecting and demanding of the organisation. In the past, it had 
linked some of its limited humanitarian intervention to efforts to promote 
human rights within the domestic arena. However, any link between human 
intervention and human rights obligations had been secondary to the goals 
found in its Charter, including the primary responsibility of the Security 
Council on the maintenance of international peace and security, which had 
been the primary motivation for its missions thus far.
If the importance of human rights in United Nations missions79 is down 
played, the missions may become disconnected from the goal of enduring 
peace. They should be used to promote substantive changes in adversely 
affected societies and in the global community as a whole. More 
importantly, the changes should preserve the worth and dignity of world 
citizens, existing and future. So far, the missions have been ad hoc,
reactive and narrowly focused on solving specific international 
emergencies.80 This is a fundamentally flawed approach that teaches States 
nothing on the disapproval of the international community to human rights 
77
 See Annan, “Two concepts of sovereignty”, The Economist, 18 September 1999 at 80.
78
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abuses and the inter-relation of national and international standards in the 
entire human rights spectrum.81 Until this lesson is brought home to States, 
human rights abuses will continue with impunity and go unabated and 
unchecked. 
There is an emerging international consensus that humanitarian 
intervention is justified if human rights atrocities take place. This is 
consistent with the original idea behind the establishment of the United 
Nations before the organisation succumbed to the tensions and divisions 
that developed during the Cold War.82 Nonetheless, the promotion of 
human rights and their protection by States are important values. The need 
to adhere to a comprehensive body of fundamental human rights provides a 
compelling justification for United Nations involvement in the political 
affairs of rogue States and it also provides a worthy rationale for the 
organisation’s continued existence. This rationale should be sufficient to 
justify the United Nations’ involvement in a State’s political affairs if the 
State deliberately and arbitrarily alters the nature and content of its 
citizens’ rights. Moreover, it should be the case even where its obligation 
to maintain international peace and security is not a direct issue. 
The selfish interests of States should not be permitted to derail the human 
rights process. They should not be permitted to use the concept of 
sovereignty to avoid the issues that clearly transcend national boundaries 
within this context. China’s Foreign Minister used arguments such as “the 
history of China and other developing countries shows [that] the 
sovereignty of a country is the prerequisite for the basis of the human rights 
that the people of that country can enjoy”.83 However, they are simply an 
apologia by States with poor human rights records and a history of brutal 
political repression. 
The development of a new United Nations policy to generate, safeguard 
81
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and deepen the entitlement of individual citizens to their fundamental 
rights should proceed and be prevented from derailment. United Nations 
Resolution 48/141 of 20 December 1993, which establishes the position of 
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, provides that “all 
human rights – civil, cultural, economic, political and social are universal, 
indivisible, interdependent and interrelated”. The Resolution recognises 
that States have a duty to promote and protect human rights. Founded upon 
this obligation a human rights custodianship policy will represent a 
significantly expanded role for the organisation and the most favourable 
form of governance in ensuring that States promote and protect human 
rights. This policy would help expand and deepen global understanding and 
the reception of human rights in general, including their indivisibility in 
particular.84
United Nations electoral missions have clarified important elements of the 
right to political participation, thus weakening the barriers to the 
advancement of international human rights. The policy of custodianship 
would go beyond the current emphasis on the technical validity of State 
actions based on sovereignty85 and take advantage of current opportunities 
to secure gains in human rights that have followed the end of the Cold War. 
Perhaps, more importantly, in responding to global dissatisfaction with the 
current ad hoc, reactive, and constricted approach to human rights 
violations,86 a new custodianship policy would focus international attention 
on actions deemed domestic or “private” by States and forces that 
perpetuate human rights abuses and inequality around the world.87
Since its founding in 1945 the United Nations has promulgated instruments 
that are collectively equivalent to an International Rights88 and helped 
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gather international consensus for the idea that the populations of States 
have rights under international law. This extends to the protection of the 
rights, even against the government. Beginning with the Charter and the 
Universal Declaration, the United Nations has constructed a normative 
framework for the realisation of rights for the people.89 The framework has 
been sustained over time by the actions of States in signing and ratifying 
various international human rights and related instruments, some of which 
are now part of customary international law. The international 
collaborative efforts involving United Nations organs, human rights 
workers and others have helped publicise the plight of the oppressed 
millions who yearn for more personal liberties and freedom from arbitrary 
detention, execution and political purges. 
Unfortunately, in interpreting its responsibilities to promote friendly 
relations among states, the United Nations has failed to give peoples, and 
thus human rights, the necessary priority. Instead, it has limited the scope 
of its responsibilities by adopting a shallow conception of its human rights 
obligations. This attitude does not permit a full response when States deny 
fundamental human rights.90 Further, those who assume that its highly 
publicised intervention missions are driven primarily by human rights 
concerns may misunderstand its role in the domestic affairs of States.91 The 
fact is that the United Nations intervenes only in few cases and when it 
does so the scope of its involvement is limited and often dependent on the 
commitment of States to act for and on its behalf.92
Generally, the United Nations has limited its mandate to promote human 
rights in States to those instances with a clear international dimension 
only93 and where the trans-boundary effect of national excesses has been 
89
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profound. It has received a significant number of appeals from States for 
more substantial involvement and a clear description of its role as the 
human rights custodian. This follows its inflexibility and failure to provide 
guiding principles for humanitarian interventions as shown by its insistence 
on using the ill-defined, unclear sobriquet “international dimension”. This 
reflects the “Age of Rights”, an expression that Louis Henkin coined and 
used for his book’s title,94 which champions the organisation’s broad 
human rights responsibility and provides for humanitarian intervention.
The current United Nations policy of pegging interventions to the trans-
boundary effects of human rights abuses and international outrage suffers 
from two significant weaknesses. First, in the 1990s it intervened twice 
only, Bosnia in 1992 and East Timor in 1999, both in the face of massive 
internal human rights atrocities. Secondly, after World War II it promoted a 
false meaning of sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs, thus 
limiting the scope of its human rights contributions. As a result, the 
weaknesses have maintained a United Nations focus on the interests of 
States and governments, not the people. They also reflect the traditional 
perspective that the organisation’s overriding purpose is to regulate the 
conduct of States vis-à-vis each other under Article 1(1) of the Charter 
rather than promote the interests or concerns of the people within the State.
INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY
International peace and security are of paramount importance to the United 
Nations. Article 39 of the Charter gives the Security Council broad powers 
to determine when peace is threatened or breached. Yet, this limits the 
ambit of Security Council concern and provides an excuse for non-action 
when human rights violations occur. This restriction is not necessarily co-
extensive with the organisation’s simultaneous implied responsibility to 
promote human rights. The attempt to combine the responsibility for 
human rights with the international peace and security responsibility, rather 
than a stand alone human rights responsibility, has led to complex efforts at 
inventing persuasive excuses for legitimising missions authorised by the 
the Security Council’s demand for access to the camps and detention centres for the 
purposes of delivering humanitarian aid. The Security Council rationalised its substantial 
involvement in Bosnia by turning the sovereignty argument around. For further details, 
see Fink, “From peacekeeping to peace enforcement: the blurring of the mandate for the 
use of force”, (1995) 19 Maryland Journal of International Trade and Law 1, 33-35.
94
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United Nations. However, many conflicts implicating serious human rights 
concerns are reasonably contained within domestic borders and their direct 
impact on international peace and security are often not articulated.95
The United Nations finds itself in juxtaposition. On the one hand, the 
concept of a threat to or a breach of international peace and security would 
lose international legitimacy if it were relied upon to justify every instance 
where it acts in support of oppressed people. On the other hand, if it adopts 
a technically justifiable or a broader interpretation of the concept, it risks 
losing credibility in the eyes of States that are ever wary of gunboat 
diplomacy.96 The key effect of linking human rights to international peace 
and security has been to constrain, rather than enhance, the organisation’s 
role in developing and defining human rights standards. Yet, at times the 
organisation should be permitted to act in support of human rights where 
no reasonable threat to or breach of international peace and security is 
obvious. Seemingly, the Charter anticipated this situation by not 
constraining the use of coercive measures when promoting human rights 
norms.97
The Charter, the Universal Declaration, the ICCPR and the ICESCR 
provide the foundation for United Nations involvement in domestic 
political affairs in the name of human rights and embody an assertive 
vision of its human rights custodianship role. This should be independent 
of the specific acquiescence of States to human rights fact-finding missions 
or findings of international dimensions in a bid to nurture and advance 
fundamental human rights universally. The Charter begins with a strong 
commitment to human rights promotion, featured prominently alongside 
the post World War II goal of preventing future international conflicts and 
conditions that foster such conflicts.98 The Charter’s origin is found in the 
preoccupation of allied war time leaders with the saving of “succeeding 
95
 Examples are the genocide that occurred in Rwanda in 1994, the civil conflict, famine 
and starvation in Somalia in 1990-92 and the brutal struggle in Liberia in the early 1990s.
96 Crosette, “China and others reject pleas that the United Nations halt civil wars”, New 
York Times, 23 September 1999 at <http://www.nytimes.com/library/wo…1/092399nati 
ons-intervention.html>.
97
 See the contrast shown by the United Nations Charter in Chapter VII on coercion in 
international security and Chapters IX-X on human rights and humanitarian matters.
98
 It appears that the traditional interpretations of United Nations, purposes found in the 
Preamble to the Charter, have adopted a distinct hierarchy that insubordinates human 
rights to sovereignty and the maintenance of international peace and security: Farer, 
“Human rights in Law’s empire: the jurisprudence war”, (1991) 85 American Journal of 
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generations from the scourge of war”.99 An overriding concern of the 
Charter’s drafters was to eliminate or reduce the causes and consequences 
of international conflict and immediately following this goal was an 
explicit commitment in the Preamble to the Charter to:
reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of 
the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of 
nations large and small, and to establish conditions under which justice 
and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources 
of international law can be maintained, and to promote social progress 
and better standards of life in larger freedom…
Scholars trace the origins of modern international human rights law to the 
horrors of the holocaust and other Nazi atrocities during World War II.100
The Charter was the first step in the “codification of international standards 
to protect human rights.”101 It laid the foundation for what has been dubbed 
the International Bill of Rights. The Universal Declaration may be viewed 
as an elaboration of the human rights commitment that is only briefly 
articulated in the Charter. In many respects the ICCPR (including its 
Optional Protocol) and the ICESCR elaborate on the commitment 
expressed in the Charter and the Universal Declaration.
Although the Charter does not contain an explicit right of humanitarian 
intervention or a role for the United Nations in the socio-political processes 
of Member States102 its human rights provisions lay the foundation for this. 
The maintenance of international peace and security and the principle of 
self-determination have motivated past and current United Nations 
missions. However, the recognition of a global responsibility for human 
rights that is rooted in the Charter should provide a better legal and 
political justification for the United Nations promoting human rights 
through various means including a deepened involvement in State affairs. 
99
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100
 See Newman F and anor, International Human Rights (1990, Anderson Publishing Co, 
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This interpretation of the Charter places human rights at the centre of the 
debate without denigrating the pivotal role of the organisation concerning 
international peace and security.
CONCLUSION
Getting the United Nations to act assertively on human rights will neither 
be easy or popular. There has been a strong tendency within the 
organisation to treat itself as essentially an association for States mainly 
concerned with international conflict management. The interests of “the 
Peoples of the United Nations”103 were long ago subsumed by the needs of 
its Member States104 when they acted in the name of their citizens. It 
occurred as well when they resisted a meaningful role for the organisation 
or the global community in human rights including accountability for the 
abuses of the same citizens. Yet at the same time, they have bound 
themselves to international instruments that guarantee fundamental 
rights.105 South Africa during the apartheid era is a classic example. For 
decades, it objected to United Nations involvement and condemnation 
regarding its treatment of non-white citizens during this period. However, 
other States, including those that rejected South Africa’s position and 
supported United Nations intervention in South Africa, had also similarly 
rejected the organisation’s scrutiny of their own human rights practices.106
Like South Africa, they did so in the name of domestic sovereignty.
The United Nations should free itself from the shackles of the classical 
interpretation of the doctrine of sovereignty107 and the principle of self-
determination when it considers engaging in pro-rights efforts in domestic 
affairs. A clear-cut human rights justification should unapologetically be 
103
 See Preamble to the United Nations Charter.
104
 The final version of the Preamble was modified to reflect the fact that although the 
agreement was between States it purported to represent the desires of the peoples of the 
world: Goodrich LM, The United Nations in a Changing World (1974, Columbia 
University Press, New York) 2.
105
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“United Nations human rights resolution, New York Times, 27 December 1995 at A15. 
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advanced to support its interventionist missions.108 For constitutional and 
political support, it should draw on its human rights responsibilities rooted 
in the Charter and supporting instruments, including the incessant demands 
of various populations for its involvement. The fact remains that a broader 
and more assertive involvement by the United Nations in the domestic 
affairs of States may cast it as a “globocop” and lead it into a dark and ugly 
political storm. Whether it is able to weather the storm as the international 
human rights custodian remains to be seen.
108
 See Henkin’s argument on the scope of United Nations obligations in human rights 
issues: Henkin L, The Use of Force: Law and US Policy in Right v Might: International 
Law and Use of Force (1991, Council on Foreign Relations Press, New York) 62-65.
